Taken at face value, the “flare up” as it was called by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, between Israel and the Lebanese Shiite group, could have had all the makings of a regional war; the first since the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) entered Lebanon in 2006 and got a bloody nose for their military endeavors. 

For months, tensions have been increasing on both sides, largely due to the consequences of Trump’s bellicose strategy to sanction Iran and Hezbollah, the fallout from which the West is suffering. From the explosion on August 12 at Al-Sagr military base used by US forces south of Baghdad (which revealed that the situation in Iraq is evolving in favor of Iran), to the capture of a British oil tanker by Tehran. The infamous Adrian Darya1 went off radar close to the Syrian port to which we all thought it was going to deliver oil to in the first place. 

The list seems to be endless; and, needless to say, the threats from Iran in recent days to move closer to producing weapons grade uranium in defiance of Europe’s scrambling to save the so-called “Iran deal” is also part of a menacing broader picture of Iran, and its allies in the region, using its strength to worry Israel. 

And Israel, along with US bases in the region, should be worried.

But while all these contributed to Israel blundering ahead with a military plan involving strikes both in Syria and, for the first time, in Lebanon, albeit with drones, there are other reasons which have also contributed to Netanyahu’s actions: illogical, incomprehensible US foreign policy in general in the region and in particular with respect to Lebanon.

Trump’s administration is deeply confused about what it wants in Lebanon.

Trump’s administration is deeply confused about what it wants in Lebanon. Just recently it unveiled a number of sanctions against Hezbollah figures and what the US administration believes is a Lebanese bank assisting the Iranian proxy. On the other hand, it also sent messages of support to Lebanon in speeches regarding its own sectarian strife, which have angered and confused Israel. 

Nasrallah was right about entering a new phase in the war and resetting the red lines. After the drone attack, the subsequent retaliation was made to set a very clear message to Israel: you will pay with the lives of Israelis on the border, if you continue to use drones to spy on and attack Hezbollah within Lebanon. 

Still, in many ways we shouldn’t get too worked up about the prospects of a war between Israel and Lebanon, not merely because President Aoun has also set a clear precedent that the Lebanese army will work with Hezbollah, but also because it simply does not make sense. 

Neither side is prepared for a war, nor wants a war. The stakes are simply too high and the spoils less clear.

Neither side is prepared for a war, nor wants a war. The stakes are simply too high and the spoils less clear.

So, what was really at the heart of the exchange and will Lebanon see more of these drone attacks? 

Almost certainly Israel will continue to launch drone strikes which will be followed up by the Lebanese army shooting at the drones and Hezbollah following through with anti-tank fire across the border. This is not a new parameter. It is not a starter’s pistol for war, but a recalibration of the terms and methodology of how Hezbollah and its regional foe will “communicate” with one another. 

The fact that Hezbollah was allowed to retaliate and that Netanyahu (allegedly) set up some dummies to play victims of Hezbollah attacks to be used as video “handouts” to media, says a lot. When Hezbollah reciprocated, it chose Israeli military positions (and not civilian) and close to the border. Disciplined, measured and clear about its message and objectives. 

What is often misunderstood by pundits who talk up war, often from afar in US universities or London think tanks, is that Hezbollah and Israel respect one another and, in many ways, need one another for political capital. But they also need to show each other that a war of words and mendacious media handling has its limits. 

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Inside Arabia.