Israel’s new strategy of expanded operations against Iranian positions and proxies has affected no country as much as Iraq. Over the past two months, at least five explosions, arguably caused by Israeli drone or missile strikes, have taken place in Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (MPF) installations on Iraqi territory, virtually turning the conflict-weary country into a new battleground between the two regional adversaries.
Against the backdrop of escalated tensions between the Islamic Republic and the United States (both close partners of Iraq), these developments could have serious implications for Iraqi domestic politics and foreign policy ranging from the presence of American forces and the integration of Iran-allied paramilitary groups into the state system to the ongoing fight against the Islamic State and Iraq’s relations with Kurdish militias in northeast Syria. Alternatively, it could also persuade Baghdad to gradually wean itself off Iran’s support politically and economically to avoid being sucked into its conflicts.
On August 26, the Fatah Coalition in the Iraqi parliament, led by Hadi al-Amiri, head of the Badr Organization close to Iran, condemned the attacks as “a declaration of war on Iraq and its people” and called for the withdrawal of around 5,000 American forces from Iraq, following an Israel-attributed drone strike in the western town of Qaim a day earlier that killed a Shia PMF commander.
The call echoed a new fatwa by Ayatollah Kazem Haeri, an influential Qom-based Shia cleric supportive of Iranian-backed PMF factions, proclaiming the presence of US military in Iraq “haram” (forbidden). “I declare from the position of religious responsibility that the presence of any US military force in Iraq is forbidden [haram] under any title: military training, advice or the rationale of fighting terrorism,” Haeri’s fatwa read. Other prominent Iraqi figures — all Iran-backed PMF groups* — have joined the chorus decrying foreign “aggression” and US-Israeli violation of Iraqi sovereignty.
Growing calls by Iraqi Shia leaders for the expulsion of US troops reflects a reinvigorated desire for greater autonomy and power on the part of Iran-aligned PMF factions, which could in turn hamper state efforts to integrate them into Iraq’s regular armed forces.
Growing calls by Iraqi Shia leaders for the expulsion of US troops reflects a reinvigorated desire for greater autonomy and power on the part of Iran-aligned PMF factions, which could in turn hamper state efforts to integrate them into Iraq’s regular armed forces.
“One of the contentious spheres is the integration of the PMF umbrella into the army, a step that faces resistance from multiple factions that are known for their links with Iran,” Tamer Badawi, non-resident fellow at the European University Institute, told Inside Arabia.
“These strikes can bolster PMF groups’ leverage versus the government as the latter has been unable to protect them because of the Iraqi army’s lack of capable air defense systems; the PMF therefore has more tools to bargain with now, to further complicate integration or push for conditions that suit its interests.”
Among the major PMF factions in Iraq—including those close to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the forces loyal to Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and the groups affiliated with the Islamic Republic—the latter have been the most resistant to the idea of absorption into the state structure, partly on the grounds that the fight against the Islamic State (IS) and other terrorist outfits is far from over.
Mounting opposition to the US military presence in Iraq could limit its operations against IS militants.
Recently, UN counterterrorism experts warned in a report to the Security Council that IS has been preparing the ground for an “eventual resurgence in its Iraqi and Syrian heartlands” and could use a war chest of about $300 million to plot terror attacks around the world. Similarly, in a quarterly report to the US Congress in early August, the Pentagon estimated that the Islamic State still boasts between 14,000 and 18,000 active members and has been silently trying to regroup for a comeback in Syria and Iraq. While the Iraqi military’s Joint Operations Command repudiated the estimation as “greatly exaggerated,” mounting opposition to the US military presence in Iraq could limit its operations against IS militants.
Notably, in response to the deadly incidents at PMF positions, and more specifically after the explosion in the al-Saqr base in Baghdad on August 12, Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi’s government started to enforce stricter regulations for “all Iraqi and non-Iraqi parties” using the country’s airspace. That included the US air force, which still conducts combat missions against the Islamic State from Iraqi territory.
According to the new rules, “armed reconnaissance, fighter planes, helicopters and drones of all kinds” now need the “exclusive approval of the general commander of Iraqi armed forces or his authorized representative,” otherwise any aircraft “will be deemed to be hostile aviation and handled immediately by our air defenses.” Tehran might even move to equip its paramilitary allies in Iraq with air defense capabilities to fend off hostile aerial attacks.
Meanwhile, Iraqi intelligence services have reportedly concluded that recent drone strikes on PMF installations were launched from bases under the control of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeast Syria, suggesting that US-backed Kurds provided Israel with key logistical assistance in its operations against Iranian-backed Shia paramilitaries. This could further complicate Iraq’s already tense relations with Syrian Kurdish groups whose autonomous rule and “democratic confederalist” system of governance in “Rojava” inspired Iraqi Kurds to seek independence in September 2017, albeit to no avail.
Partly due to relentless US pressure, there are already arrangements under way to reduce Iraq’s energy dependence on Tehran and diversify its sources of imports by connecting its power grid to Iran’s Arab rivals.
While these corollaries might translate into greater power and influence for Tehran in Iraqi affairs, an Iranian-Israeli fight on Iraqi territory is equally likely to push Baghdad away from the Islamic Republic in the long run, so that it could be spared the consequences of Iran’s contentious regional strategy, not the least of which is Iran’s hostility towards Israel and the US. Partly due to relentless US pressure, there are already arrangements under way to reduce Iraq’s energy dependence on Tehran and diversify its sources of imports by connecting its power grid to Iran’s Arab rivals. Currently, around 30%-40% of Iraq’s power supply comes from Iranian electricity and natural gas, with electricity imports accounting for roughly a quarter of the total.
The expansion of Iranian-Israeli enmity from Lebanon and Syria into Iraq has ostensibly put Iraq in a tough position: It must strike an unlikely balance between the interests of two rival, regional blocs, both of which happen to be its indispensable partners.
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* Such groups as Ammar a-Hakim, head of the National Wisdom (Hikmah) Movement, Qais Khazali, leader of PMF group Asaib Ahl al-Haq (“League of the Righteous”), and Abu Ala al-Wala’i, head of the Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada militia “Battalions of the Sayyid of Martyrs” (which in Twelver Shiism refers to Imam Hussein who was killed in the Karbala Battle in 680 CE).
