Much of the focus behind Libya’s turmoil is on the impact of the 2011 NATO intervention, along with external interference leading to general Khalifa Haftar’s ongoing assault on the capital Tripoli. Meanwhile much less attention rests on how the nature of the oil-rich country’s pre-revolution state gave rise to the chaos after its demise, which is essential for domestic and international policy makers to recognize for future peace measures.
The United Nations-recognized Government of National Accord, led by President Fayez al-Serraj, sits in Tripoli, yet has minimal control over the country. It has also opposed the Government of National Salvation headed by Prime Minister Khalifa Ghwell built on the remnants of the General National Congress (GNC), that was the parliament originally elected in 2012. Meanwhile in Tobruk there is the House of Representatives and the Haftar-led and self-styled Libyan National Army.
Yet while such a domestic power struggle plays out, parts of Libya are largely ruled by various local groups. Many of which seek to represent their region’s interests.
Control by various such leaders over the years has influenced Libya’s political situation. Libya was historically divided. Even under pre-colonial Islamic rule, it was split between three major areas: Tripolitania in the West, Cyrenaica in the East, and Fezzan in the South.
After Libya’s independence in 1951 from Italian colonization and afterwards Anglo-French oversight, post-colonial ruler King Idriss controlled the country from Tripoli on behalf of his Western backers. He was essentially propped up by Western powers, including Britain and the United States, in exchange for Western military bases operating in the country and oil companies given exploration rights. Thus, he gradually centralized control of the young country in Tripoli.
Muammar Gaddafi’s bloodless 1969 revolution against Libya’s King Idriss however brought significant changes. Heading the nationalist Jamahiriya (Republic) regime, he sought to terminate Western influence over the country, impose stricter social laws, and completely nationalize Libya’s oil with the creation of the Tripoli-based National Oil Company in 1970.
Gaddafi’s increasing authoritarianism and attempts to secure control over the country enhanced Tripoli’s significance as a power center. Speaking to Inside Arabia, Tarek Megerisi, Libya analyst at the European Council of Foreign Relations, explained that Gaddafi used a divide-and-rule policy to manage Libya’s diverse tribal communities.
Meanwhile, there were very few institutions in Libya. Power was mostly concentrated in the hands of Gaddafi’s tiny ruling elite, and it was not decentralized.
Meanwhile, there were very few institutions in Libya. Power was mostly concentrated in the hands of Gaddafi’s tiny ruling elite, and it was not decentralized. While presenting himself as the ongoing leader of the revolution, he sought to prevent a coup and dominate all aspects of Libyan life. This is essentially what set the foundations for the country’s collapse after his demise in 2011.
The Libyan central bank and other institutions located in the capital gave rise to sectarian competition over Tripoli following the 2011 revolution, Megeris explained.
Particularly because controlling Libya’s wealth is essential for any faction seeking self-empowerment. Khalifa Haftar also seeks to seize control of Tripoli in order to control its central bank, which would be a huge gain for his forces’ attempts to rule the country via military means.
During the 2011 intervention, many of NATO’s forces were targeting state infrastructure, communication networks, defensive strongholds, administrative locations, and more.
Some have argued that Western states intervening in the conflict did not understand Libya, as Libya’s political dynamics under Gaddafi were unlike any Western nation-state. With the sole goal of regime change, there was little focus on stabilizing the country post-intervention.
The intervention itself was not the main cause of Libya’s destabilization, but the lack of management within Libya after the regime’s collapse, and the limited international support for new state-building.
Tarek Megerisi however argues that the intervention itself was not the main cause of Libya’s destabilization, but the lack of management within Libya after the regime’s collapse, and the limited international support for new state-building. Most importantly, Western powers failed to provide necessary support for Libyan parliamentarians and state-building initiatives. Libyans have since been held hostage to power struggles between rival factions.
In seeking to build a new parliament, various parties such as the National Forces Alliance and the National Front for Salvation of Libya tried to unify various elements from the Gaddafi era, as well as new figures, into movements that could control Tripoli and its economic wealth. They had sought to contend with Islamist movements, which had been able to maneuver well in Libya’s new political landscape.
Yet due to infighting and the inability of one party to establish firm centralized control, no movement has lasted for long. Libya is mostly made up of short term ‘alliances of convenience,’ in order to serve long-term interests and gain economic dominance.
Even Haftar’s forces, which only has a few thousand fighters at its core, is supported by a wider network of local militias, who all seek the spoils of war.
Ultimately, due to the Tripoli-centered nature of Libya, the power struggle essentially has been focused on dominating Tripoli.
As outside powers still seek to influence Libya for their own interests by supporting either Haftar or the GNA, to dominate Libya from Tripoli, they are prolonging instability. Controlling the country from Tripoli requires force, which would trigger a huge backlash from the rest of the country.
The idea of imposing a top-down solution on Libya for its democratic peace process has faced disapproval for neglecting the wider dynamics within the country. After all, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, France, Russia, and Saudi Arabia have supported Khalifa Haftar to control the country whereas Italy and Turkey back the GNA. There has also been criticism of Germany’s wishes to hold a conference in Berlin to ‘stabilize’ the country.
Karim Mezran, North Africa analyst and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, put it bluntly when he stated, “local leaders asked to be left alone in trying to rebuild their own country.”
International efforts could be beneficial if they were restricted to facilitating dialog and if they included representatives of Libyans from all over the country.
International efforts could be beneficial if they were restricted to facilitating dialog and if they included representatives of Libyans from all over the country.
Megerisi argues that decentralizing Libya, while giving more power to local governance and granting equal rights such as shared oil revenues across the country, is a more pragmatic option to ensuring long-term stability in Libya.
He recognizes, however, that while external actors in Libya continue to stoke the conflict, peaceful unification is but a distant prospect.
READ ALSO
