The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia hosted indirect talks in Jeddah in early September between warring factions in southern Yemen. The aim was to prevent a further escalation of violence in Aden and nearby areas. These talks followed weeks of violent clashes between Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces and United Arab Emirates (UAE)-sponsored southern separatists, which intensified in August when the latter usurped control of Aden. Given that this violent power struggle in southern Yemen has done much to crumble the Arab coalition fighting Houthi rebels, as well as severely test the Saudi-Emirati alliance, Saudi officials hoped that the talks in Jeddah would resolve this escalating crisis between Yemenis favoring the country’s post-1990 unity and those fighting to split the country along north-south lines.
As Yemen is increasingly beset by conflicts within conflicts, the country’s war has become more multi-sided and complex with a growing rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Nonetheless, the talks stalled with both the UN-respected government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and the Southern Transitional Council (STC) preparing to continue their combat. Thus, the “civil war within a civil war” in Aden and other parts of southern Yemen is set to heat up with major implications for Riyadh-Abu Dhabi relations and UN efforts to resolve the crisis in Yemen. As Yemen is increasingly beset by conflicts within conflicts, the country’s war has become more multi-sided and complex with a growing rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
The fighting between Hadi’s government and the STC, which has been (at least until recently) a nominal ally of Saudi Arabia within the anti-Houthi front, further exposes the extent to which Riyadh’s strategies in Yemen have failed to achieve the Kingdom’s objectives. What remains to be seen is how Saudi Arabia will act if the STC refuses to cede its recently obtained control of Aden in the face of Riyadh demanding that it does so. Underscored by the Saudi military’s inability to defeat the Houthis’ dominant militia, Ansarullah, it is doubtful that the Saudis could achieve a decisive military victory over the STC, which is made up of tens of thousands of Emirati-trained fighters.
Why did the talks in Jeddah stall? The main reason is that the STC refused to integrate itself into the forces under Hadi’s authority. Another key factor is that the secessionists called for the STC to fill the position of Vice President, which is currently filled by Hadi’s close ally, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, plus two major ministries. In response to these requests from the STC, Yemen’s Information Minister, Moammar al-Eryani, stated that the STC’s demands “mean legitimizing taking up arms against the State . . . . We cannot accept the existence of armed groups outside the government’s authority, it is against the constitution and the law.”
Saudi frustration and anger are growing toward Abu Dhabi, which Riyadh correctly sees as responsible for the STC’s power that has grown at the expense of Yemen’s territorial integrity as a nation-state.
Saudi frustration and anger are growing toward Abu Dhabi, which Riyadh correctly sees as responsible for the STC’s power that has grown at the expense of Yemen’s territorial integrity as a nation-state.
The STC’s usurpation of Aden has also further weakened the Hadi government’s ability to portray itself as Yemen’s “legitimate” government. After all, in 2014, the Yemeni government lost control of the capital, Sana‘a, before losing Aden (its so-called “temporary” capital) last month, illustrating just how weak Hadi’s administration is on the ground notwithstanding the support that it receives from Riyadh and Washington.
The UAE is pursuing its own agenda in Aden. On September 5 thousands of southern Yemenis held a rally in Aden to show their support for Abu Dhabi. The UAE’s interests and priorities in southern Yemen are clashing with those of Saudi Arabia in ways that are increasingly visible. Thus, the Arab coalition no longer retains the ability to mask its own members’ conflicting interests for the purpose of maintaining a semblance of unity in the fight against Houthi insurgents.
The UAE is pursuing its own agenda in Aden. On September 5 thousands of southern Yemenis held a rally in Aden to show their support for Abu Dhabi.
The UAE’s direct military intervention in support of the STC in late August involved the Emiratis striking forces loyal to Hadi (described by officials in Abu Dhabi as “terrorist targets”), highlighting the UAE’s vested interests in preventing Saudi-backed Yemeni government fighters from recapturing Aden. It is doubtful that the UAE and the forces which it sponsors in southern Yemen will heed Riyadh’s calls for a refocus on the fight against Houthis because Abu Dhabi and the STC’s priorities are in southern Yemen, not in the north where Ansarullah has spent the past five years consolidating its power.
To the contrary, it appears far more likely that the Emirati leadership will focus on its efforts to prepare for a renewed push by Hadi’s loyalists to retake control of Aden and the Abyan region. A major factor in play pertains to the role of Yemen’s local Muslim Brotherhood offshoot, al-Islah. With Abu Dhabi and the STC viewing al-Islah as a “terrorist” group, both have stakes in preventing the faction from playing a role in Yemen’s future political arena. Thus, preventing Hadi’s government (which includes al-Islah figures) from controlling southern Yemen is key as Abu Dhabi and the STC see it. Meanwhile, Riyadh has pragmatically worked with al-Islah ever since the Arab coalition entered Yemen in March 2015, viewing the Sunni Islamist group as a valuable partner in the struggle against perceived Iranian expansionism in the southwestern Arabian Peninsula.
Since last month, the balance of power in the south has shifted decisively in the UAE/STC’s favor, at the expense of the Saudi and Yemeni governments’ ability to shape realities on the ground in the war-torn country.
Since last month, the balance of power in the south has shifted decisively in the UAE/STC’s favor, at the expense of the Saudi and Yemeni governments’ ability to shape realities on the ground in the war-torn country. Yet the situation is fluid and the STC’s ability to maintain its recently obtained power is anything but guaranteed. As fighting continues to flare up between the different groups that seek to assert authority over Aden, it is unclear whether Riyadh and Abu Dhabi will successfully reconcile their competing and clashing interests in southern Yemen. In the process, not only is a war with weapons raging, but so is a war of narratives. Questions of legitimacy and who constitutes a “terrorist” in Yemen are key variables driving this escalation of violence in Aden and other parts of southern Yemen.
Ultimately, with respect to ongoing combat in the Aden area, the stakes are high. The fighting is for Yemen’s future state structure, whether Yemen should remain one state governed by a central authority or split.
Ultimately, with respect to ongoing combat in the Aden area, the stakes are high. The fighting is for Yemen’s future state structure. Whether Yemen should remain one state governed by a central authority or split into two (or perhaps three or more) with the STC ruling the land that the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen governed from 1967 to 1990 as a newly independent south Yemen is a question that Yemenis cannot agree on. So long as this question continues to deeply divide the country and the external actors involved in Yemen’s crisis, negotiations in Jeddah or any other city are unlikely to achieve a watershed breakthrough, particularly when players on the ground believe that they are more likely to accomplish their goals through combat rather than compromises made at roundtable talks.
Nonetheless, as two Arabian Gulf states that align closely on many—but not all—regional issues, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are working to prevent the conflict between their surrogate armies in southern Yemen from undermining their otherwise strong alliance. On September 8, Saudi and Emirati state media released a joint statement that “reaffirmed [Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s] continue support for the legitimate government of Yemen” and demanded that “all operations” and “media propaganda” that drive hostility come to an end. Although such a statement may sound reassuring, it is anything but guaranteed that either the Hadi administration or the STC will be receptive to this joint statement.
